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UP IN THE AEREO: DID THE SUPREME COURT JUST
ELIMINATE THE VOLITIONAL CONDUCT REQUIREMENT
FOR DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT?
Kyle A. Brown*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia calls American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc. “the latest skirmish in the long-running copyright battle over the
delivery of television programming,”1 but this skirmish may have
warlike consequences. The United States Constitution gives Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2
This
constitutional language suggests that the Framers intended that
consumers be the ultimate beneficiaries of the intellectual property
system. The Intellectual Property Clause is not meant to give the
wealthiest broadcasters a steel grip over competition and new
technology, but rather to promote the progress of science.
Pursuant to this power, Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1976, which gives a copyright owner certain enumerated rights in his
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1
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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work.3 At issue in the Aereo case4 is the right to perform the copyrighted
work publicly.5 Aereo was a start-up business that provided access to
basic cable by capturing and streaming free, over-the-air broadcasts6 on
the Internet. The company spent time and money to ensure that its
system fit squarely within a loophole in the current Copyright Act as
determined by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.7 Aereo sought to
change the way that we watch local television, to break the iron grip
that cable companies have over all of us, and to keep more of our hardearned cash in our pockets instead of the giant cable companies’.8
Today, cable systems generally use a scheme of channel bundling as
opposed to allowing customers to purchase only the channels that they
watch, meaning customers are forced to pay for channels that they
never use in order to get the few that they want. Aereo charged eight
dollars per month for its streaming service;9 the current price for the
most basic television package from major cable systems is at least twice
Aereo’s cost with one cable company charging as much as sixty-five

3

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014) (listing the six exclusive rights of the copyright owner
as the rights: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by renting, leasing, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission).
4
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2498.
5
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
6
See Chloe Albanesius & Jamie Lendino, Aereo: Everything You Need to Know,
PCMAG (Apr. 22, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2417
555,00.asp (explaining that major broadcasters like CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX, the CW,
and PBS are all available with an Aereo subscription, but pay TV, like HBO or SyFy, is
not available. Aereo only gives users access to programming that they can already
access for free in their homes by using an antenna and a digital HDTV tuner).
7
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 395 (S.D.N.Y
2012) (“Aereo has made substantial investments of money and human capital in its
system, all in reliance on the assumption that the Second Circuit meant what it said in
Cablevision rather than what it did not say.”), aff’d, 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d,
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
8
Ted Kritsonis, Aereo’s CEO Wants to Turn TV on its Head (And Big Media Wants His
Head), DIGITAL TRENDS (July 20, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/hometheater/aereos-ceo-wants-to-turn-tv-on-its-head-and-big-media-wants-his-head/.
9
Jon Skillings, Aereo Fine-Tunes its TV Streaming Prices, Plans, CNET (May 13, 2013,
5:52 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/aereo-fine-tunes-its-tv-streaming-prices-plans/.
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dollars per month for basic cable.10
Unfortunately, Aereo must be referred to in the past tense
following the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision. Because the Court
declared Aereo’s service illegal, the company decided to cease
operations and eventually declared bankruptcy in late 2014.11 Aereo
was not the only company impacted by the Court’s decision; in fact,
companies and individuals across the country will have to change
business models, products, and services because the Court eliminated
any need for volitional conduct in order to find direct copyright
infringement. In addition to eliminating the most significant element
required to prove direct copyright infringement, the Court also
created a double standard for so-called “cable systems” that lowers the
bar for finding direct infringement in cases where the looks-like-cableTV standard applies. Aside from putting Aereo out of business, the
Court’s decision threatens advancements in Internet streaming
technology and forces the American people to pay exorbitant
subscription prices to cable companies that, for the most part, operate
with the bottom line prioritized over the customer.
Part II of this Comment provides the reader with background
information on the cable industry and sets the scene for Aereo’s entry
into this highly competitive business. Part III provides a description of
Aereo’s technology, including the trial court’s factual findings, which
were conceded throughout the appellate proceedings. Part IV
considers the history of the Copyright Act and analyzes the relevant
case law providing a foundation for the Aereo decision. Part V of this
Comment examines the Supreme Court’s decision and its effect on
copyright law. Part VI explores the implications of the Court’s
decision, investigates how the Court may have produced unintended
consequences with its ruling, and argues that the Court, while
attempting to limit the decision to cable television lookalikes, in fact
eliminated the traditional volitional conduct requirement. The

10

See Shop, XFINITY SHOP, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/
DigitalCable/Digitalcable.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Limited
Basic” plan at $20 per month); Digital Cable TV Plans & Packages, TIME WARNER CABLE,
https://www.timewarnercable.com/en/plans-packages/tv/digital-cable-tv-plans.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Starter TV” package at $19.99 per month);
Optimum TV: Better Television, OPTIMUM, http://www.optimum.com/digital-cabletv/pricing.jsp (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Optimum Value” plan for $64.95
per month); Fios TV, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/home/fiostv/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “FiOS TV Local” plan for $10 per month).
11
Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.
html?_r=0.
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Court’s decision had this consequence because the majority ventured
too far beyond the text of the Copyright Act to rule against Aereo; this
part also argues that the Court should have followed historic patterns
and let the legislature amend the Copyright Act to respond to
technological advancements that fill loopholes in current copyright
law. Part VII concludes.
II. WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE: HOW THE BROADCAST AND CABLE
INDUSTRIES WORK TOGETHER
In order to fully appreciate the landscape surrounding this case,
it is important to understand how the broadcast business works and
why a technology like Aereo’s is frightening for major broadcast
television companies. Like many American battles, this is not a fight
over what is morally right or what is best for the public; this is a fight
over money. Broadcasters make the majority of their money from
three sources: advertising, compulsory licensing fees, and
retransmission fees.12 Advertising revenue was not an issue in this case
primarily because Nielsen13 had made a change in its procedures to
bring Aereo viewers into the rating equation.14 Compulsory licensing
fees were also not the main issue in this battle. Those fees are
established in § 111 of the Copyright Act, which provides that cable
systems, at a maximum, may have to pay up to approximately three
percent of gross receipts in royalty fees to the broadcasters.15
The main issue in this battle was the fact that Aereo did not pay
any retransmission fees to the broadcasters who brought the lawsuit.
Why are these fees the most important part of this battle? Because,
unlike compulsory licensing fees, retransmission fees are not
statutorily regulated in amount; instead, they must be negotiated in
good faith.16 These fees are established by the 1992 Cable Act,17 which
12

See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014); Miriam Gottfried, Network Fees Create Drama for
Broadcasters, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/network-feescreate-drama-for-broadcasters-heard-on-the-street-1411331884.
13
Nielsen Company provides a “Nielsen rating” for each program on television,
which measures the size and composition of the audience for the program. That data
is then used to calculate the rate for a commercial spot during the particular program.
About Us, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2015).
14
Brian Stelter, Nielsen Adjusts Its Rating to Add Web-Linked TVs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2013), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/tvs-connected-tothe-internet-to-be-counted-by-nielsen/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
15
17 U.S.C. § 111(d).
16
47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C) (2014).
17
See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385 (1992); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.55–62 (2014) (implementing cable must-
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provides commercial broadcasters, every three years, with two options.
First, broadcasters may elect the “must carry” provision requiring all
cable systems in the area to carry their programming.18 Importantly,
broadcasters do not get paid retransmission fees if they select this
option.19 The second, more popular option allows broadcasters to
renegotiate their contracts with cable systems every three years,20 which
is where the real money is made.21
Retransmission fees provide broadcasters with a massive amount
of leverage that leaves cable companies in an undesirable position. If
cable providers negotiate too hard for their customers, their customers
end up losing access to desired programming; if cable providers do not
fight hard enough, however, their customers must pay incredibly high
prices for access to broadcast television that the public has a right to
receive for free over the air. For example, Time Warner Cable
subscribers in Corpus Christi, Texas lost access to their local NBC
affiliate for nearly five months and missed out on the Super Bowl in
2012 because the broadcaster and Time Warner could not reach an
agreement.22 That demonstration of power followed one in 2010 when
FOX banned Cablevision from showing games one and two of the
World Series to Cablevision subscribers.23 Broadcasters use their
superior bargaining power to leverage cable companies into paying
high retransmission fees, which ultimately result in pass-through
charges to consumers ranging anywhere from one to five dollars per
carry); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64 (2014) (implementing cable retransmission consent).
18
See 47 C.F.R. § 76.55–62 (implementing cable must-carry).
19
See JEFFERY A. EISENACH, PH.D., DELIVERING FOR TELEVISION VIEWERS:
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND THE U.S. MARKET FOR VIDEO CONTENT 5 (2014),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2014/PUB_Retransmission
_Consent_0714.pdf.
20
See id.
21
See Kevin Hunt, Kevin Hunt: What Is $1.50 ‘Broadcast TV Fee’ On Cable Bill? (It’s
Worth
Billions),
HARTFORD
COURANT
(Apr.
28,
2014),
http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=510&siteid=2420&id=5855178&
t=1398723072 (“Broadcasters get $3 billion a year in retransmission fees from cable
and satellite providers, according to research firm SNL Kagan.”); Roger Yu,
Retransmission Fee Race Poses Questions for TV Viewers, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/14/tv-retransfees/2512233/ (describing retransmission fees as expected “to more than double from
$2.36 billion in 2012 to $6.05 billion—about 23% of total TV station revenue—by 2018,
according to industry research firm SNL Kagan.” And reporting, “The stakes are high:
At Nexstar, retrans revenue rose 64.2% to $23.8 million in the first quarter this year,
outpacing the more modest 32.6% growth in advertising. Other broadcasters report
similarly increasing rates.”).
22
Yu, supra note 21.
23
Hunt, supra note 21.
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month.24
In addition to traditional cable companies, broadcasters exert
their iron grip on satellite companies like DirecTV, which reported
that its retransmission fee rates went up eight percent in the latest
round of negotiations.25 Of course, neither satellite nor traditional
cable systems can realistically refuse to reach an agreement with any
major broadcaster because failure to carry a major network will result
in massive customer losses for the provider. With no way for cable
systems to fight back, broadcasters are free to demand exorbitant
retransmission fees to the American people’s detriment.26
Essentially, this is a fight over how the American people can
receive copyrighted works broadcast over frequencies that we, in fact,
own. Undisputedly, you have a right to set up an antenna, a TV, a DVR,
and a Slingbox,27 which together would give you your own version of
Aereo right in your home. The plaintiffs in this case urge the Court to
expand broadcaster copyright protections beyond the scope of the
Copyright Act’s text in order to provide themselves with a monopoly
over the methods that deliver their programs to the consumer. The
unpopularity of the current regime is evidenced by HBO’s recent
announcement that it will “offer a stand-alone streaming service
directly to Internet customers beginning [in 2015], taking a giant step
toward breaking the pay-TV bundle that has been a cornerstone of the
television industry for more than a quarter-century.”28
Finally, not all broadcasters oppose Aereo; in fact, it is only the
largest, wealthiest few who have filed suit. An amicus brief in the case,
filed by a group of small and independent broadcasters (“SIBs”),
revealed the damaging effects a decision against Aereo would have on

24

See id.
Id.
26
See Yu, supra note 21 (“CBS is seeking to roughly double its retrans fee total to
about $500 million this year.”).
27
See SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/DiscoverSling.aspx (last visited Sept.
23, 2015). A Slingbox enables a person to watch programming from his cable
subscription on any Internet connected device. The Slingbox connects to the user’s
cablebox and allows access to all the channels to which the user is subscribed and to
the user’s DVR. This allows a user to pay for only one cablebox and have access to the
programming on other televisions within the home and on any Internet connected
device on the go, and even allows access via the Internet while the user is traveling
internationally.
28
Meg James, HBO Going ‘Over the Top’ with Internet Streaming Service in 2015, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/
cotown/la-et-ct-hbo-to-launch-internet-only-service-20141015-story.html.
25
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their businesses.29 SIBs provide content that is not available on the
major networks; for example, Cocola Broadcasting, a Fresno-based
broadcaster, provides Hmong-language programming to the sizable
Hmong population there, which has been completely ignored by
major broadcasters.30 Technology like Aereo’s would provide those
individuals with a cheap service allowing access to vital news and
information in their native language.
Another benefit of Aereo’s service was that it would have allowed
SIBs to expand viewership in their respective markets. For example,
“once Aereo became available in Cincinnati, Ohio, small broadcaster
WKRP began actively promoting the use of Aereo to expand viewership
and increase interest among viewers who were otherwise unable to
receive WKRP’s signal clearly.”31 Large broadcasters do not want to
lose market share to these SIBs who provide diverse content to local
communities. According to the amici SIBs, broadcasters “have
accepted a basic bargain: In return for their right to broadcast freely
over the public airwaves, consumers have the reciprocal right to use an
antenna to access their over-the-air broadcasts, and to make personal
recordings of the broadcast programs without license or payment.”32
SIBs contend that large broadcasters have “reneged on this bargain,”33
and that in order to increase their own power and wealth, those large
networks believe that “they are entitled to control how and when
individual audience members tune the antennas that receive their
transmissions for private recording and viewing.”34
The Court’s decision hurts Aereo as a business, but the biggest
loss is borne by the American people who have lost a valuable
technological advancement, have been stripped of the opportunity for
a more free-flowing exchange of ideas, and have been forced into the
chokehold of cable companies who are free to charge shocking prices,
since their only competition has just been deemed illegal. The Court’s
decision miscalculates the proper balance that the Framers intended
to achieve with the Intellectual Property Clause; the decision
overemphasizes the protections afforded by the Copyright Act and
undervalues the fact that Congress is instructed “to promote the
29

Brief of Amici Curiae Small and Independent Broadcasters in Support of
Respondent, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014
WL 1319385.
30
Id. at 5–6.
31
Id. at 6–7.
32
Id. at 8.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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progress of science and useful arts,”35 not to promote the self-interests of a
few large, powerful broadcasting companies.
III. PARADISE CITY: AEREO’S INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY
Aereo designed its technology platform with the Cablevision36
decision in mind, intending to utilize the four guideposts set out in
that case to ensure that its business would be in compliance with the
Second Circuit’s view of the Copyright Act’s Transmit Clause.37
“Aereo’s system allows users to access free, over-the-air broadcast
television through antennas and hard disks located at Aereo’s
facilities.”38 Subscribers may use any Internet-connected device
including, but not limited to, televisions, computers, tablets, or smart
phones to stream their selected program online.39 Aereo users have
the choice to either “Watch” or “Record” the programming that they
desire to view.40 While the initial choice may make a difference in the
retention of the video file after playback is complete, any meaningful
distinction is eliminated by the fact that users who initially select
“Watch” may, during viewing, select to “Record,” and users who
initially record may start to watch before the program has completely
aired.41 Therefore, from the user’s perspective, Aereo operates
similarly to a DVR that has been connected to a Slingbox,42 or
equivalent technology, which allows a user to stream data from his DVR
to his Internet-connected device.43
Behind the scenes, Aereo’s system is inert until a user-generated
request springs the system into action.44 By clicking “Watch” or

35

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008).
37
See WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (discussing each of the four guideposts gleaned from the
Cablevision decision. First, “the Transmit Clause directs courts to consider the potential
audience of the individual transmission.” Second, private transmissions should not be
aggregated. “Third, there is an exception to this no-aggregation rule when private
transmissions are generated from the same copy of the work.” Finally, any factor
limiting the potential audience of a particular transmission is relevant to the Transmit
Clause analysis.).
38
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
39
Id. at 377.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See SLINGBOX, supra note 27.
43
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
44
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2518 (2014).
36
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“Record,” the user sends a signal to the Aereo system, which tunes a
specific antenna to the frequency corresponding to the program the
user wants to watch.45 The data collected by the antenna is passed
through a transcoder, which creates a digital file of the program that
is stored in a directory unique to the user.46 The system then waits
approximately seven seconds, while a portion of the program is saved
to the user’s directory, before beginning playback.47 Both the antenna
capturing the free, over-the-air broadcast, and the file subsequently
created are unique to the user. At any given time, an antenna may
either be inert or in use by a maximum of one user.48 Additionally,
each file saved to Aereo’s system is accessible only by the user who
created it.49
Assignments of antennas to users occur based upon the user’s
subscription type, with the majority of users opting for the “dynamic”
configuration over the “static” plan.50 A dynamic user is assigned an
antenna randomly and becomes the sole user of that antenna for the
duration of the program.51 After the program has aired, the antenna
has finished its job and is then free to be assigned to another user at a
later time.52 In comparison, static users have a set of antennas
previously assigned to them. Every time a static user watches or records
a program, he is guaranteed that the antenna capturing the signal will
be one of his previously assigned antennas.53
The only factual dispute in the trial court was whether the
antennas housed in Aereo’s warehouse operated independently or
collectively as a unit.54 Plaintiffs claimed that the antennas operated
collectively, while Aereo contended that each antenna operated
independently.55 The antennas consist of a pair of dime-sized metal
loops.56 Eighty antennas are present on each circuit board with a metal
rail that separates the antennas from the electrical components used

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78.
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013).
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 683.
Id.
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
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to operate the antennas.57
Each housing contains a parallel
configuration of sixteen circuit boards.58
Each party presented expert testimony at trial regarding the
collective or independent nature of the antennas.59 After reviewing all
of the evidence, the trial court “[found] that Aereo’s antennas
function independently.”60 The plaintiffs did not challenge that
finding on appeal; thus, the fact that each antenna operates
individually is undisputed for the purpose of appellate review.61
In summary, “Aereo’s system creates a subscriber-specific
copythat is, a ‘personal’ copyof the subscriber’s program of
choice,” which is stored in a subscriber-specific folder and streamed
over the Internet directly to the subscriber’s Internet-connected
device.62
IV. YOU AIN’T THE FIRST: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976
The Statute of Anne, promulgated in 1710, is considered the first
modern copyright statute because it was the first time that authors
received rights in their respective works.63 Copyright law in the United
States has existed since colonial times, with the first federal copyright
laws coming shortly after the ratification of the Constitution.64 The
modern Copyright Act has been interpreted and revised a number of
times since its origination. It is that pattern of interpretation by the
Court and revision by the legislature that is relevant here.
A. The Fortnightly and Teleprompter Cases
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the Court
considered the copyright liability of a community antenna television
(“CATV”) system.65 The CATV provider installed antennas on the tops
of hills surrounding two cities and used amplifying technology to send
the signals via coaxial cable to its subscribers.66 The CATV system

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 381.
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502–03 (2014).
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 17 (9th ed. 2013).
Id. at 20–21.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
Id. at 391–92.
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constantly transmitted a television signal to its subscribers; a subscriber
only had to switch on his TV and turn to any of the five programs that
were being transmitted at a given time.67 Each subscriber would receive
the same programming at the same time, which included only
unedited transmissions of the original broadcasts.68
A copyright owner challenged the CATV system as an
infringement of his right to publicly perform his work.69 The United
States Supreme Court, interpreting the Copyright Act of 1909, held
that broadcasters performed, but viewers did not perform.70 The 1909
Act did not contain a specific definition of “perform” and did not
contain the Transmit Clause found in the current version of the Act.
Instead, the Court found that “resolution of the issue . . . depend[ed]
upon a determination of the function that CATV plays in the total
process of television broadcasting and reception.”71 After drawing this
line, the Court concluded that a CATV provider was more akin to a
viewer than a broadcaster, and as such, it was incapable of performing
and therefore, incapable of infringing the copyright holder’s public
performance right.72 According to the Court, “a CATV system no more
than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s
signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection
to the viewer’s television set.”73
What is crucial to note about the Fortnightly decision is not what
the Court ultimately held, but rather what the Court refrained from
doing in its decision. The Court explicitly noted that it had been
presented with a difficult task in “read[ing] the statutory language of
60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change.”74 Instead of
letting the pressures of outside commentators and officials interfere
with the Court’s duty to apply the law, the Justices reached a conclusion
in line with the law as written and not the law as it should have been
updated to reflect the changes in technology made between 1909 and
the 1960s. Justice Stewart, in concluding the majority opinion, noted
that the Court had “been invited by the Solicitor General . . . [to]
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright,

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 398.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 396.
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communications, and antitrust policy.”75 Wisely, the Court “decline[d]
the invitation,” stating, “[t]hat job is for Congress.”76 Instead, the
Court applied the Copyright Act of 1909 as written to hold that the
CATV providers did not “perform” the copyrighted works under the
Act.77
Six years after the Fortnightly decision, the Court granted certiorari
in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., which involved
a CATV system similar to that at issue in Fortnightly.78 Teleprompter’s
technologies were essentially the same as those employed by
Fortnightly, but as can be expected, in the six years between these
cases, technology improved. Teleprompter’s system was capable of
delivering broadcast programming originating a distance of more than
450 miles away from the subscriber,79 whereas the Fortnightly case dealt
with systems carrying signals for 52–82 miles.80
The plaintiffs in Teleprompter attempted to distinguish their CATV
system from the Fortnightly system, noting that even if an individual
subscriber owned his own antenna, the curvature of the earth would
make it impossible for him to receive a signal from such a great
distance.81 The crux of the argument was that CATV providers, who
offered a service that an individual viewer could not provide for
himself, did not fall on the viewer’s side of the line82 drawn in
Fortnightly.83
The Court then quickly addressed some of the underlying
concerns presented in the case, including the CATV system’s effect on
the relationship between advertisers and broadcasters, calling the
“reallocation of the potential number of viewers each station may
reach, a fact of no direct concern under the Copyright Act.”84
Ultimately, the Court found the alleged distinctions unconvincing and
followed precedent established in Fortnightly to again “hold that CATV
operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the
programs that they receive and carry.”85
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 401.
Id.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 401–02.
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
Id. at 400.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392.
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 400.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–99.
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 401–02.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 404 (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–01).
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Although the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act negated the
Teleprompter Court’s interpretation of “perform,” the Court’s deference
to the plain meaning of the statutory language remains important.
The Court noted that “[s]hifts in current business and commercial
relationships, while of significance with respect to the organization and
growth of the communications industry, simply cannot be controlled
by means of litigation based on copyright legislation enacted more
than half a century ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV
was yet conceived.”86 The Court again wisely refrained from rewriting
the decades-old Copyright Act even though there was a sense that the
Justices were indeed hoping that the Fortnightly decision would invite
Congress to review the Act. Instead of violating traditional notions of
separation of powers, Justice Stewart gave the legislature another
reminder that “[d]etailed regulation of these relationships, and any
ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems in
this field, must be left to Congress.”87
B. The 1976 Revision of the Copyright Act
The 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act were, in large part, a
legislative response to the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter.88 The Justices had called for this action at the end of both
opinions in an effort to maintain the proper balance between the
judiciary and legislature. In response, the 1976 Copyright Act
contained three significant changes that expressly rejected the Court’s
finding that CATV providers did not perform.
First, Congress provided that “to ‘perform’ an audiovisual work
means ‘to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible.’”89 Second, Congress enacted the Transmit
Clause, which was wholly absent from the 1909 Act, and which provides
that an entity performs publicly where it “communicates [a
performance] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are
received beyond the place from which they are sent.”90 Finally,
Congress enacted § 111, which “creates a complex, highly detailed
compulsory licensing scheme that sets out the conditions, including
the payment of compulsory fees, under which cable systems may

86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 414.
Id.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014).
Id. at 2505–06 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014)).
Id. at 2506 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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retransmit broadcasts.”91
In the Aereo opinion, Justice Breyer
concluded that Congress made these three changes “to bring the
activities of cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act.”92
C. Sony: Volitional Conduct and “Time-Shifting”
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. involved the
invention of the Betamax VTR (predecessor to the once-popular
VCR), which allowed customers to record copyrighted programs
primarily for the purpose of watching the program at a later time, a
process Sony labeled “time-shifting.”93 In Sony, the Court held that in
order to be liable for direct infringement, the actor must “personally
engage[] in infringing conduct.”94 The Court established that the
concept of contributory infringement in copyright comes not from a
copyright statute, but rather from the Patent Act and the common law
concept of vicarious liability.95 Therefore, in order to be found liable
for contributory infringement, there must be some legal relationship
or other affirmative actlike providing the copyrighted work to be
infringed96in order for a third party to be liable for the infringer’s
conduct. The Court then went on to hold that “time-shifting” was a
non-infringing fair use,97 meaning the Betamax had significant noninfringing uses and that Sony was not liable for contributory
infringement.98 Aereo’s appeal only addressed the “Watch” streaming
feature, but if a hypothetical company were to offer subscribers only
the “Record” portion of Aereo’s model, Sony may provide a way around
the Aereo decision.99
91

Id. at 2506 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88).
Id. at 2506.
93
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
94
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 433).
95
Sony, 464 U.S. at 434–35 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2014); Kalem Co. v. Harper
Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
96
Id. at 434–37.
97
Id. at 454–55.
98
Id. at 455–56.
99
The argument would be that while Aereo provided a service similar to CATV
systems by delivering essentially live TV, this hypothetical record-only Aereo would be
more akin to the Betamax VTR. It would only be able to record programing for later
viewing after the program has aired, just like an old VCR. If the Court were to apply a
black-box analysis, like the analysis applied in Aereo III, infra Part VI.B, the basic input
and output for the recordings would be almost identical to those in Sony. The user
initiates the recording by pressing or clicking a button, some magic happens, and then
after the program airs, the recording is available. It should not matter that the
hardware is located in a warehouse instead of a user’s home; if the end result is that
the user is viewing the program in a private manner, then that is fair use. No infringing
92
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While Sony remains important for its holdings regarding the line
between fair use and copyright infringement and affirming the
volitional conduct requirement, the case also provides dicta regarding
the proper role of the Court and of Congress in copyright matters. The
Sony Court pointed out the historic roles of the judiciary and the
legislature in the United States, noting that “[r]epeatedly, as new
developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress
that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made
necessary.”100 This pattern of technological advances followed by
amendments to the copyright law was broken in Aereo III when the
Court reached beyond the scope of the Copyright Act’s text to include
a new technologyInternet streamingunder laws that the Court
recognized were intended to deal specifically with cable television
systems. In addition, the Sony Court explicitly mentions the limitations
of judicial power, saying: “It may well be that Congress will take a fresh
look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other
innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that have not
yet been written.”101
Thus, the Sony decision is important not only because it held that
direct infringement requires some personally infringing conduct,
known as the volitional conduct requirement, but also because it
reinforced the Court’s pattern of refraining from going beyond the
text of the Copyright Act applicable to the suit and leaving the
legislature to do its job in amending or revising the statute.
D. The Second Circuit’s Particular Transmission Approach
In Cablevision, the Second Circuit dealt with a case involving
Cablevision’s use of remote storage DVR (“RS-DVR”) technology to
allow customers without set-top DVRs to record programs at a “remote”
location.102 A number of copyright owners brought suit claiming that
Cablevision’s failure to obtain licenses to operate or sell the RS-DVR
resulted in direct infringement of their exclusive right to reproduce
and publicly perform the copyrighted works.103
The RS-DVR system worked in a manner similar to the Aereo
system, but with two major differences. First, instead of capturing a
program once for each user, Cablevision’s system used a single
conduct by the user means no infringement to which Aereo-record-only can
contribute.
100
Sony, 464 U.S. at 430–31.
101
Id. at 456.
102
Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
103
Id. at 124.
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stream104 of incoming data to produce a copy of the program for each
user.105 What that means is that Cablevision used the single stream of
data, for which it had a license, and made a copy of that entire stream
to send through the Broadband Media Router (“BMR”)106 and then
through a primary ingest buffer107 to be processed.108 Second,
Cablevision initially buffered every incoming program to prepare it for
saving on a hard disk regardless of whether a customer had actually
requested the recording of that program.109
The Cablevision court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim that
Cablevision’s RS-DVR would infringe its right to publicly perform the
copyrighted works under the Transmit Clause.110 The district court
looked to the potential audience for an underlying work, which, as the
Second Circuit noted, is the public in each and every imaginable case,
rendering every transmission of a copyrighted work “to the public”
regardless of the number of people actually capable of receiving the
specific transmission.111 This approach, looking to the potential
audience for an underlying work instead of a specific transmission, is

104

See id. Each “copy” received by any Cablevision user was the product of the
same underlying data stream, whereas each Aereo user received a “copy” that was
produced by a different antenna and transcoder than every other user’s copy.
Therefore, each Cablevision customer received a copy of the exact same data, which
came from the split stream through the buffers, while each Aereo customer had a copy
of different data. Hypothetically, if there was interference with some, but not all, of
Aereo’s antennas, it was possible for two Aereo users who chose to record the same
program at the same time to end up with different data since each “copy” was
produced wholly independently of each other “copy” of the same programming.
105
Id. at 124–25.
106
Id. (stating that the BMR is used to reformat incoming data into a data stream
that can be utilized by the primary ingest buffer. The BMR is used constantly,
regardless of whether any user has made a request to record the programming, and
holds up to 1.2 seconds of programming at any given time).
107
Id. (stating that the primary ingest buffer’s job is to hold the entire stream of
data coming from the BMR for a split second while the system determines if any
customers have requested to record the programming in the buffer. If there has been
a request made that data is sent to a secondary buffer, which in turn creates a copy of
the programming on a hard disk in a directory allocated specifically to the user. The
primary ingest buffer is constantly operational and holds no more than a tenth of a
second of each channel’s programming at any given time).
108
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124–25.
109
Id. See also supra notes 106 & 107 for a brief discussion of the main buffers
used regardless of whether there had been a user request for the data. It could be
argued here that Cablevision chooses to record every program and their customers
only choose to not stop the recording and get a personal copy, though this seems like
a negligible distinction given the transitory nature of the initial recording.
110
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134.
111
Id. at 135–36.
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called the “aggregate audience approach” within this Comment.
The Second Circuit found the lower court’s reading of the
Transmit Clause incorrect because of the implications of that reading
on current technology. Following the lower court’s reasoning would
mean that if HBO transmitted a copyrighted work to Cablevision and
Comcast, then Cablevision retransmitted that work from one
Cablevision facility to another without transmitting it to any customers
while Comcast transmits the program to its customers, then
Cablevision would be publicly performing solely because of the acts of
Comcast.112 Clearly, this result is illogical. Additionally, the Second
Circuit pointed to the unfortunate and irrational impact of such an
interpretation on individual consumers.
Under the aggregate
audience approach, “a hapless customer who records a program in his
den and later transmits the recording to a television in his bedroom
would be liable for publicly performing the work simply because some
other party had once transmitted the same underlying performance to
the public.”113 This is undoubtedly a scary and unsustainable
interpretation for any consumer who owns a multi-room DVR.
The Second Circuit, in rejecting the district court’s reasoning,
looked to the statutory language of the Transmit Clause, and its
legislative history, to conclude that the RS-DVR system at issue made
only private performances, noting that each “transmission of a
performance is itself a performance.”114
The Second Circuit
determined that the question to be answered in the face of a Transmit
Clause issue is “who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular
transmission of a performance.”115 Answering this question, in
Cablevision, the court concluded that only the particular customer who
requested the recording was capable of receiving the transmission at
issue, rendering the performance, or the transmission, not “to the
public” under the Copyright Act.116
Because the Second Circuit recognizes each transmission as a
distinct performance, the main issue is whether the individuals capable
of receiving a particular transmission constitute “the public.”
Historically, the Second Circuit’s approach fits with the CATV cases
because in those cases, the particular transmissions at issue originated
from a single antenna. That single transmission was carried through

112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138.

BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

260

11/4/2015 11:48 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:243

coaxial cables to provide every subscriber with the exact same
programming at the exact same time from the exact same device; thus,
the audience for the particular transmission constituted “the public.”
This approach therefore gives credence to the legislative changes
incorporated into the 1976 Act to bring CATV systems within its reach,
while staying true to the Act’s text and refraining from artificially
enlarging the scope of copyright protection beyond that which the
legislature has guaranteed.
V. GET IN THE RING: AEREO GOES TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Lower Court Decisions
The appeal presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a
motion filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in 2012 to enjoin Aereo “from engaging in those
aspects of its service that allow its users to access ‘live’ copyrighted
content over the internet.”117 As the trial court noted, “the issue . . . is
quite limited.”118 The issue is limited in two respects: (1) “Plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting that Aereo was directly
liable for copyright infringement by publicly performing Plaintiffs’
copyrighted works[,]”119 and (2) the “motion was further limited in
scope, challenging only the aspects of Aereo’s service that allow
subscribers to view Plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs
contemporaneously with the over-the-air broadcast of these
programs.”120
Although the district court entered a lengthy opinion in the case,
the ultimate disposition is easily summarized in two sentences: “But for
Cablevision’s express holding regarding the meaning of the provision
of the Copyright Act in issue here—the transmit clause—Plaintiffs
would likely prevail on their request for a preliminary injunction.
However, in light of that decision, this Court concludes that it is bound
to DENY Plaintiffs’ request.”121
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court’s
decision and affirmed the order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction.122 The circuit court’s opinion sheds some light

117
118
119
120
121
122

Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 376.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 375.
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
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on why Aereo’s system falls beyond the reach of the Copyright Act.
First, and most importantly, in the Second Circuit, “technical
architecture matters.”123 This is significant because the Second Circuit
does not reason by analogy or resemblance; instead, the court actually
looks at the technical functionality of a system to determine whether
the system performs publicly or privately.124
Second, the court recognizes that the legislative intent of the 1976
Copyright Act requires the court to determine whether a transmission
is made to the public.125 The court specifically rejects the aggregate
audience approach, which makes all transmissions public, noting that
“if Congress intended all transmissions to be public performances, the
Transmit Clause would not have contained the phrase ‘to the
public.’”126
The Second Circuit ultimately rested its conclusion on the
Cablevision decision, which is circuit precedent, holding that, “Aereo’s
transmissions of unique copies of broadcast television programs
created at its users’ requests and transmitted while the programs are
still airing on broadcast television are not ‘public performances’ of the
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works under Cablevision.”127 Thus, the issue
presented to the Supreme Court for review was a limited one: an
appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction against
Aereo alleging direct copyright infringement for only the “Watch”
portion of Aereo’s service, which allows users to contemporaneously
view broadcast programs on Aereo’s system while those programs are
being aired.128
B. The Majority’s Opinion
Petitioners in this case, television broadcasters who own
copyrights in many of the programs that Aereo streams to subscribers,
argued “that Aereo was infringing their right to ‘perform’ their works
‘publicly,’ as the Transmit Clause defines those terms.”129 The majority
recognized two distinct questions to be answered in this case. First,
123

Id. at 694.
Id. at 695 (“[U]nanticipated technological developments have created tension
between Congress’s view that retransmissions of network programs by cable television
systems should be deemed public performances and its intent that some transmissions
be classified as private.”).
125
Id. at 694.
126
Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)).
127
Id. at 696.
128
See supra text accompanying notes 119 & 120.
129
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503–04 (2014).
124
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does Aereo “perform”? And second, if it does, is that performance
“public”?130
In answering the first question, the Court engaged in what the
dissent called a “looks-like-cable-TV” analysis.131
The majority
proceeded to engage in a historical analysis of the Fortnightly and
Teleprompter cases, and the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act that
effectively overruled those cases.132 The Court needed to engage in this
analysis because the rest of the majority opinion was fashioned through
analogies to CATV providers of the 1960s. First, the Court stated the
universally accepted fact that Congress made the 1976 amendments to
the Copyright Act “to bring the activities of cable systems within the
scope of the Copyright Act.”133
Then, although the majority recognized some differences in
technology between CATV and Aereo, noting that CATV systems
“transmitted constantly” whereas Aereo’s system is “inert until a
subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program,” the Court
determined that the technological differences did not merit a
substantive discussion.134 In fact, one of the biggest differences in
technology between the 1960s and today is the Internet, which in the
1960s was completely undiscovered, but is part of our everyday lives
today. The majority acknowledged that the Internet plays a large role
in Aereo’s system, but concluded that “this difference means
nothing.”135
After disregarding most technological differences between the
CATV providers of the 1960s and Aereo’s current technology using
small antennas, transcoders, Internet-connected servers, and a webbased mobile interface,136 the Court then analogized Aereo’s system to
that of CATV providers from the 1960s to affirmatively answer the
question of whether Aereo performs. The majority accepted the
difference between Aereo’s inert system and the constant
transmissions of CATV systems, but concluded that “the many
similarities between Aereo and cable companies, considered in light of
Congress’ basic purposes in amending the Copyright Act, convince us

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 2504.
Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2504–07.
Id. at 2506.
Id. at 2507.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
See id. at 2503 (describing Aereo’s technology).
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that this difference is not critical here.”137
Next, the Court took on the difficult task of defining the
performance, which is necessary to answer the next question regarding
whether that performance is public. The Court began this analysis by
disregarding the text of the Copyright Act and substituting its own
beliefs based on what “Congress would . . . have intended to protect a
copyright holder from.”138 The basis for the majority’s ultimate
conclusion is essentially that the Act does not mean what its text
explicitly says. According to the Court, “[t]he fact that a singular noun
(‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’ does not suggest”
that the performance involves only a singular transmission.139 Instead,
the Court concluded that this statutory language “suggests that an
entity may transmit a performance through multiple, discrete
transmissions.”140 Ultimately, the majority “conclude[d] that when an
entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images
and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them
regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes.”141
Thus, the Court took the leap that the Second Circuit refused to take
in Aereo II and adopted the aggregate audience approach.
This resolution led to the holding that, “when Aereo streams the
same television program to multiple subscribers, it ‘transmit[s] . . . a
performance’ to all of them.”142 The Court recognized the commercial
objective of Aereo’s business and brought the Ninth Circuit’s
commercial nature analysis143 into play.144 Finally, after finding Aereo’s
practices “highly similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter,” the Court “conclude[d] that Aereo ‘perform[ed]’
petitioners’ copyrighted works ‘publicly,’ as those terms are defined by
the Transmit Clause.”145
137

Id. at 2507.
Id. at 2509.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
142
Id.
143
See Jacob Marshall, Note, Trading Rabbit Ears for Wi-Fi: Aereo, the Public Performance
Right, and How Broadcasters Want to Control the Business of Internet TV, 16 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 909, 934 (2014) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is essentially that
“because commercial enterprises necessarily open their services ‘to the public,’ any
transmissions they make must transitively also be public”); see also Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(expanding on the Ninth Circuit’s commercial nature theory of infringement).
144
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
145
Id. at 2511.
138
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C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia’s dissent stands in stark contrast both to the
majority’s holding and to the entire progression of analysis used to
reach the conclusion in the case. The dissent began by stating that the
public performance claim “fails at the very outset because Aereo does
not ‘perform’ at all.”146 As opposed to the majority, Justice Scalia
believes that “the question is who does the performing.”147 Since the
issue is one of direct copyright infringement, Justice Scalia recognized
that there could be liability only if Aereo itself had engaged in
volitional conduct that violated the Copyright Act.148 Because the
dissent found that Aereo’s subscribers were the actors, not Aereo itself,
Justice Scalia concluded that Aereo had not performed at all and
therefore could not be found liable for direct infringement.149
Next, Justice Scalia performed a direct copyright infringement
analysis, something the majority seemed to disregard entirely. Justice
Scalia’s inquiry noted that in order to be liable for direct infringement,
as petitioners in this case argued, Aereo must have personally engaged
in infringing conduct.150 This requirement, known as the “volitionalconduct requirement,” has been a crucial element of finding direct
copyright infringement since Sony.151 In a case like this one, where a
system may be used to view both copyrighted works and noncopyrighted works, “courts require ‘some aspect of volition’ directed
at the copyrighted material before direct liability may be imposed.”152
Generally, that issue is resolved by determining who selects the
copyrighted content: the defendant or its customers.153 After working
through this analysis, Justice Scalia ultimately determined that “Aereo
does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple reason that it does not make
the choice of content.”154
Justice Scalia then moved on to a discussion of the majority

146

Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
148
Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149
Id.
150
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)).
151
Sony, 464 U.S. at 434; see also Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d
1060, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2014); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc. 373 F.3d 544, 549–
50 (4th Cir. 2004).
152
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting CoStar, 373 F.3d at
550–51).
153
Id. at 2513 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008)).
154
Id. at 2514.
147
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opinion, which, the Justice argued, suffered from a “trio of defects.”155
First, the Court, perceiving the text to be ambiguous, relied on
“snippets . . . from a single report issued by a committee whose
members make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses of
Congress” to give thrust to the interpretation necessary to support the
majority’s ultimate conclusion.156
Second, the Court disregarded every technical difference
between Aereo’s system and CATV systems stating plainly, and without
justification, that those dissimilarities “do[] not make a critical
difference.”157 It is unclear whether the majority disregarded these
differences because it did not understand the technological
differences between the systems, but the looks-like-cable-TV standard,
which the Court announced, certainly suggests that the Justices in the
majority simply lacked the ability to discern the importance of
technological differences between the systems.
Third, Justice Scalia argued that “even accepting that the 1976
amendments had as their purpose the overruling of [the Court’s]
cable-TV cases, what they were meant to do and how they did it are two
different questionsand it is the latter that governs the case before us
here.”158 Justice Scalia recognized that Congress, in 1976, amended the
Copyright Act in order to bring the operations of the CATV providers
in the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cases within the purview of the Act,
but the dissent did not accept the theory that the Act should now be
interpreted to require analysis by analogy to those systems. “The injury
claimed is not violation of a law that says operations similar to cable TV
are subject to copyright liability, but violation of § 106(4) of the
Copyright Act.”159 The dissent did not believe that the Copyright Act,
as written, included Aereo’s conduct within the meaning of a public
performance.
After detailing the trio of defects, Justice Scalia’s dissent pointed
out that the majority’s opinion created two standards for direct
copyright infringement: one that seems to apply to cable company
look-alikes and one that applies to everyone else.160 The confusion
created by this double standard will be shown immediately upon
remand in this very case. As Justice Scalia pointed out, “On remand,

155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 2515.
Id.
Id. at 2507.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2516.
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one of the first questions the lower courts will face is whether Aereo’s
‘record’ function . . . infringes the Networks’ public-performance
right.”161 The volitional-conduct rule clearly answers that question in
the negative, “[b]ut it is impossible to say how the issue will come out
under the Court’s analysis, since cable companies did not offer remote
recording and playback services when Congress amended the
Copyright Act in 1976.”162
It seems that Justice Scalia is not concerned with the Court’s
ultimate disposition of the case. In fact, Justice Scalia “share[d] the
Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or enabling to be
done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought not to be
allowed.”163 Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s opinion because
it introduces more uncertainty into the law. According to the dissent,
“It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated
systems now in existence are governed by the traditional volitionalconduct test and which get the Aereo treatment.”164
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the Court’s role in this case as
compared with Congress’s role in legislating, a point which the
majority failed to address. “[W]hat we have before us must be
considered a ‘loophole’ in the law. It is not the role of this Court to
identify and plug loopholes. It is the role of good lawyers to identify
and exploit them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it
wishes.”165 Justice Scalia believes that “the proper course is not to bend
and twist the Act’s terms in an effort to produce a just outcome, but to
apply the law as it stands and leave to Congress the task of deciding
whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.”166
VI. LIVE AND LET DIE: THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN AEREO
AND VOLITIONAL CONDUCT
Careful determination of what constitutes a performance is
crucial to the ultimate issue of whether that performance is public or
private because only public performances are infringing under the
Copyright Act. An improper interpretation of what constitutes the
performance may have detrimental effects on other types of
technology that are already widely in use and generally considered

161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 2517.
Id.
Id.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2518.
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non-infringing. Though the dissent suggests that Aereo does not
perform at all, this view seems to be foreclosed by the plain language
of the statute, which includes transmissions as performances.167 Under
the Copyright Act, one performs an audiovisual work by showing its
images in any sequence, making the sounds accompanying it audible,
or transmitting the work.168 The Act states, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a
performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent.”169 Therefore, under the plain language of the statute,
both the user and Aereo perform whenever the user watches a
program using Aereo’s service. The user, through his Internetconnected device, shows the images on screen and makes the sounds
accompanying them audible so that he can enjoy the program. Aereo
transmits the program from its antennas through the transcoders and
servers to the user’s device.
But recall that the Copyright Act does not prohibit the
transmission of a copyrighted work; § 106(4) only prohibits a public
performance.
Therefore, the real issue is whether Aereo’s
performance is a public one. This is where the Court makes use of the
looks-like-cable-TV standard and other analogies to reach the
erroneous conclusion that Aereo performs publicly. The proper
course of action would have been to apply the Copyright Act as written
to find each particular transmission to be a private performance, which
would allow the legislature to make any necessary amendments after
assessing the impact that a new business like Aereo has on the cable
industry as a whole. After all, the public, not the author, is supposed
to be the biggest beneficiary of the copyright laws.
A. Ruling by Unnecessary Analogy
First, the majority concluded that “Congress would as much have
intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities
of Aereo as from those of cable companies.”170 The fact that the Court
believed that Congress, in the 1970s, would have intended certain
protections implies that, in fact, Congress did not explicitly protect a
copyright holder from Aereo-type activities. If Congress had so
intended, then why would the Court not say “Congress intended . . . “?

167
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014) (“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to
transmit or otherwise communicate . . . the work . . . .”).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509 (emphasis added).
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The answer must be that the Court substituted its beliefs in the year
2014 for what the majority believes Congress might have intended fifty
years before; note also that the Court cites no authority for this
conclusion. In fact, Congress would have needed a crystal ball to
formulate any thoughts at all on Aereo-type services before or during
the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, considering that personal
computers were not introduced until the early 1980s, the first
experiment linking commercial email to the Internet was just getting
underway in 1988, and the first publicly available web-browser was not
launched until 1993.171
Next, the Court played an interpretation game with the statutory
language to conclude, again without citing any authority, that “the fact
that a singular noun (‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’
does not suggest” that each individual transmission is a separate
performance.172 This finding is crucial to the Court’s holding; without
giving a singular noun a plural meaning, the Court could not have
reached its ultimate holding. It is not surprising that the Court cites
no authority for such a form of statutory construction considering that
the weight of authority is clearly contrary.173
The Court then used these findings to announce what is
essentially the aggregate audience principle previously discussed
within this Comment. The majority “conclude[d] that when an entity
communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and
sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them
regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes.”174 All
that matters is that people have received the same underlying work
from a single entity. If those people constitute the public and the
perceptible images and sounds are copyrighted, then following Aereo,
the entity making the transmission has directly infringed the copyright
holder’s exclusive right to perform the work publicly regardless of
whether the entity actually engaged in any infringing conduct itself.
To understand the impact of the Court’s decision on other
technologies beyond cable television and cable television look-a-likes,
171

Internet Service Provider (ISP), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2015), available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/746032/Internet-service-providerISP.
172
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
173
See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citing United States v. Ron Pair
Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95,
102–03 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. 53 (1810)).
174
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
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consider the following hypothetical. Dropbox is now a popular filesharing service that uses cloud-computing technology to allow users to
share any files. Hypothetically, if a law student were to upload a digital
copy of a Parks and Recreation175 episode to Dropbox and share it with
forty-five people from his 1L class, then clearly Dropbox has directly
infringed NBC’s copyright, right? Dropbox is an entity, and through
Dropbox’s technology the same contemporaneously perceptible
images and sounds have been communicated to forty-five separate
people who must be considered the public. This seems like an odd
result since most people would react by saying, “But wait, Dropbox
never really did anything wrong.” This is the problem with the Aereo
decision.
To avoid this far-reaching consequence, instead of focusing on
the Transmit Clause’s first reference to “a performance,” the Court
should have focused on the definitive “the performance,” which clearly
indicates that the statute is concerned with a single performance.176
The text of the Copyright Act itself provides ample evidence that a
single performance is the correct interpretation. The Act expressly
defines a public performance as one where “the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or
in separate places.”177 This makes sense in light of the Congressional
intent to bring CATV providers within the bounds of the Copyright
Act, since those providers were sending a single transmission (a single
performance) to all of their customers; thus, the ratio of transmissions
to subscribers was one transmission to many subscribers. The key
difference with Aereo’s technology is that each transmission is only
capable of being received by a single subscriber. In other words, the
ratio here is one transmission to one subscriber. Therefore, the
performance is only capable of being received in one place by one user,
which should remove it from the purview of the Transmit Clause
altogether because the performance is private, not public.
Now we reach the most critical step in the Court’s decision: the
majority’s refusal to consider any technological differences between
CATV providers of the 1960s and Aereo. While the majority
acknowledged at least one technological difference between CATV
systems and Aereo’s technologynamely that CATV providers sent
continuous streams to all subscribers while Aereo’s system was inert
until the subscriber selected a programthe Court concluded that

175
176
177

A copyrighted broadcast television program that originally aired on NBC.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
Id. (emphasis added).
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“this sole technological difference between Aereo and traditional cable
companies does not make a critical difference here.”178 The fact that
the majority seems to think that this is the sole technological difference
between the systems shows a lack of understanding of the technologies
at issue. Of primary concern is the majority’s reasoning behind the
irrelevancy of this technological difference.
The Court claimed that because this difference is “invisible to
subscriber and broadcaster alike,”179 it should be ignored. This
rationale seems unsupported; the Transmit Clause does not reference
the visibility of the technology that drives the process delivering the
content. The Court has dismissed the technical intricacies and focused
solely on input and output. Undermining the already feeble
conclusion that this technological difference does not matter is the
Court’s acknowledgement, immediately following the invisibility claim,
that, “In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology
providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s
equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on
whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”180
These differences, however, are not to be considered when other
“similarities” between the technologies at issue “convince [the Court]
that [the] difference is not critical.”181
What the Court appears to evaluate is not the technology at all,
but the end result of a process. Engineers call this type of analysis
“black-box testing,” meaning that the system is viewed solely in terms
of its input and output without any knowledge of its internal
workings.182 The Court does not inquire into whether the black-box is
made up of coaxial cables connected to a giant antenna to send a
constant stream to all subscribers or whether it is comprised of dimesized antennas connected to the Internet through a complex process
of transcoders and buffers to send a limited signal to a single
subscriber. What matters to the Court is that television programs are
being transmitted and broadcasters are unpaid. The problem is that
the Court gives no guidance as to which technologies qualify for a user
involvement inquiry and which get the black-box treatment.
A final example of the contradictory nature of the Court’s
decision comes directly from the majority’s claim that cable system

178
179
180
181
182

Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RON PATTON, SOFTWARE TESTING 55 (2d ed. 2006).
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DVRs will be unaffected by the ruling. Cablevision has stood for the
proposition that a cable provider does not need to pay any additional
fees to broadcasters in order to provide DVR services, even though
cable providers split the one incoming signal for which they actually
pay into two streams in order to provide these services.183 The court
determined that the DVR service was providing private, not public,
performances since only the singular customer who requested the
recording could watch the recorded program from a particular DVR.184
Clearly, DVR copies of a program communicate the same underlying
work to multiple people, who constitute the public, through multiple
transmissions. It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s definition of what
constitutes direct infringement of the public performance right with
the continued legality of DVR services.
B. Schrödinger’s185 Cable Company
An additional issue with the Court’s ruling by analogy to outdated
technology is that it leaves Aereo in a precarious position after the
decision. The Copyright Act makes many provisions for cable
companies, including the § 111 provision for compulsory licensing
agreements.186 If Aereo were to qualify as a cable system under the Act,
then it would be allowed to continue its operations after paying the
broadcasters a fee, which would ultimately drive up the cost of Aereo’s
service, but not kill the company and its technology entirely. This is
not the case with Aereo because the Court did not hold that Aereo was
a cable system under the § 111; instead, the Court held that because
there were so many similarities between Aereo and CATV providers of
the 1960s, Aereo was violating § 106(4) of the Copyright Act.187
The Second Circuit, where this case is being tried, has circuit
precedent that stands for the proposition that Internet streaming
companies like Aereo are not cable systems within the meaning of §
183

Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 137.
185
See Erwin Schrodinger, FAMOUS SCIENTISTS, http://www.famousscientists.org/
erwin-schrodinger-2/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (stating that Erwin Schrödinger was a
Nobel Prize-winning Austrian physicist who focused much of his career on quantum
theory. However, he may be best known today for a thought experiment he developed
to explain a theory of quantum mechanics known colloquially as Schrödinger’s Cat.
The executive summary involves a cat in a closed container and there is some random
event that may, with equal chances, either take place or not take place within the
closed container, but if it does, it will kill the cat. Thus, while the container remains
closed, the cat is equal parts dead and alive.).
186
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014).
187
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
184
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111 of the Copyright Act.188 The Second Circuit did not create this
rule; instead, it is an acknowledgement that “[t]he Copyright Office
has consistently concluded that Internet retransmission services are
not cable systems and do not qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses.”189
This inconsistent treatment between related sections of the Copyright
Act creates quite the conundrum for Internet streaming services.
If Aereo, according to the Supreme Court, infringes § 106(4)
because it is too much like a cable company, yet it does not qualify for
a compulsory license under § 111 of the same statute because the
Copyright Office has concluded that Internet streaming services are
not cable systems, then what type of beast is Aereo? Perhaps Aereo is
a Schrödinger’s cable company of sorts; both a cable company and not
a cable company at the same time.
Unlike Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment, Aereo’s
situation was actually remanded by the Supreme Court for the district
court to decide.190 Upon remand, Aereo made three new arguments
against the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.191 First,
Aereo argued “that in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Aereo III,
it should be considered a ‘cable system’ that is entitled to a compulsory
license under § 111 of the Copyright Act.”192 The argument was that
because the Supreme Court determined that Aereo was sufficiently
similar to a cable system to come within the purview of the 1976
amendments to the Copyright Act with respect to the Transmit Clause,
it should also be found sufficiently similar to a cable system for
purposes of the § 111 compulsory license since that section was added
to the Act as part of a single statutory scheme that Congress developed
to handle CATV provider copyright liability.193
The district court rejected Aereo’s argument, finding that “the
Supreme Court consistently stated throughout its opinion that Aereo’s
similarity to CATV systems informed its conclusion that Aereo
performs, not that Aereo is a cable system.”194 The court went on to
note the Supreme Court’s silence on the § 111 issue, but determined
that the “void . . . is filled by on-point, binding Second Circuit
188

See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 284–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
Internet streaming company ivi was not a cable system under the Copyright Act).
189
Id. at 283.
190
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150555 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014).
191
Id. at *12–13.
192
Id. at *13.
193
Id. at *16–17.
194
Id. at *17.
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precedent“195 from WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.196 In concluding the § 111
analysis, the court noted that Congress, in 1988, added § 119 of the
Copyright Act to provide compulsory licenses for satellite TV providers
who did not qualify for those licenses under § 111.197 Congress may
ultimately determine that another provision should be made for
Aereo-type services, but until then, compulsory licenses are not
available to these Internet-streaming services.
The district court ultimately granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction “barring Aereo from retransmitting programs
to its subscribers while the programs are still being broadcast.”198
Though this ruling only technically barred Aereo from using the
“Watch” aspect of its service, the company ceased all operations,
presumably because of users’ ability to use the “Record” function in
essentially the same manner as the “Watch” function.
Although Aereo elected to discontinue its entire service, it is
worth taking a brief moment to think about what the Supreme Court’s
opinion really decided. Aereo cannot allow users to watch any
programming while it is currently airing, but so long as Aereo’s system
does not allow a user to click “Play” until one second after the program
has aired, it may continue to provide users access to copyrighted
material without violating the Copyright Act and without paying
broadcasters any fee.
This situation shows exactly why the Court should not have used
the looks-like-cable-TV standard adopted by the majority in the Aereo
decision. The problem is that the Court, while attempting to vindicate
the supposed intentions of Congress, is not able to provide this new
type of cable-look-a-like with statutorily authorized compulsory licenses
to transmit content like Congress provided for CATV systems in 1976.
While Congress clearly intended to bring the CATV systems of the
1960s within reach of the Copyright Act, the drafters also provided a
way for those companies to remain in business and continue to provide
services that benefit the American people. Congress enacted § 111,
which allows the government to monitor and maintain a fair price for
compulsory licenses to transmit copyrighted programming, striking
the proper balance between promoting the progress of science and
securing to authors exclusive rights in their works.199 Congress was able

195
196
197
198
199

Id. at *20.
WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).
Aereo IV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *26–27.
Id. at *40.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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to find a suitable balance because of its ability to thoroughly weigh the
competing interests of the nation and create laws that attempt to strike
the appropriate constitutional and societal balance.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, for good reason, is
generally reluctant to go beyond the specific issues presented in a
particular case. While the Court announced that companies with
sufficient similarities to cable providers infringe copyright protections,
the majority does not have the legislative power to provide that those
same companies also qualify for compulsory licenses. This deficiency
shows just one reason why the Court erred in straying from the
traditional volitional conduct requirement to establish a new test
specific to companies that strike the Court as sufficiently similar to
CATV companies of five decades ago.
Instead, the Court should have applied the traditional volitional
conduct test to find that Aereo was not infringing on a protected
copyright and then deferred to Congress to determine the
ramifications of this technological advancement on the 1976 Act. Such
a decision would have given Congress the opportunity to debate and
balance the competing interests in order to make a decision as to
whether or not Internet-streaming services like Aereo should be swept
under the Copyright Act’s protections, and furthermore, whether
those streaming services should be lumped together with cable systems
or put into their own unique category. Congress would then have the
opportunity to provide compulsory licensing for those streaming
companies in order to provide opportunities for useful technology to
deliver beneficial services to the American people while still offering
some level of protection for copyright holders. Instead, the Court cuts
Aereo down at the knees, which caused Aereo to suspend its service
and file for bankruptcy, and created an air of uncertainty in the
Internet-streaming and cloud computing industries that undoubtedly
has stifled the development of useful technology because of the
unclear legal grounds for marketing those technologies.
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C. Erosion of the Volitional Conduct Requirement
The volitional conduct requirement is central to the law of
copyright liability because it distinguishes between direct and
secondary liability.200 Direct infringement occurs “when an actor
personally engages in infringing conduct”201 or where “the defendant
itself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”202 On
the other hand, secondary liability “is a means of holding defendants
responsible for infringement by third parties, even when the
defendants ‘have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.’”203
The distinction in most suits against equipment manufacturers or
service providers is drawn by determining whether the manufacturer,
or provider, itself engaged in the infringing conduct or whether it was
the customer who committed the volitional act.204 This is the case
because the Copyright Act does not expressly impute liability to any
person or company for another’s infringement.205
The majority and the dissent seem to be on opposite ends of the
spectrum when it comes to volitional conduct. The majority never
even mentions the term “volitional conduct,”206 but the dissent rests its
conclusionthat Aereo does not performon the fact that Aereo
users are the actors making the choice of content.207 This dichotomy
creates a point of tension that will not only create confusion in years to
come, but has already had a significant impact on similar pending
cases.208 In fact, pleadings have already been filed in the United States
district courts arguing that a majority of the Supreme Court in Aereo
“acknowledgedand ultimately dismissedthe dissent’s call for

200

Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2514 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2512 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 433 (1984)).
202
Id. at 2513 (citing CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th
Cir. 2004)).
203
Id. at 2512 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 435).
204
Id. at 2512.
205
Sony, 464 U.S. at 434.
206
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2498–2511.
207
Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208
See Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 296, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (plaintiff arguing that volition is not required for direct
infringement); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 27, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, 2014 WL 10100767 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015)
(No. 12-CV-04529(DMG)), 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3675 (arguing that the
Dish Anywhere platform directly infringes Fox’s copyrights after Aereo).
201
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‘volition’ as an element of direct infringement.”209
The dissent’s argument is straightforward and comports with the
Court’s previous cases involving direct infringement of an equipment
manufacturer or service provider that offers a product to the public
that is capable of infringing use.210 There is one rule for direct
infringement: “A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has
engaged in volitional conduct that violates the Act.”211 Accordingly, the
dissent determined that the first question to be answered with respect
to direct infringement is whether Aereo itself engaged in the volitional
conduct. Much like in Sony, Aereo simply provides equipment that a
customer can use to record and watch some television programming.
According to the undisputed facts, “Aereo’s automated system
does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a subscriber
selects the program and tells Aereo to relay it.”212 Aereo is nothing
more than a warehouse full of metal until a customer makes a demand;
Justice Scalia likens it to a copy shop that allows patrons to use copy
machines to copy any material they please, whether copyrighted or
not.213 In both cases, the operation of the system is a volitional act and
a but-for cause of the infringing conduct, but “that degree of
involvement is not enough for direct liability.”214 Based on the
longstanding volitional conduct requirement, Justice Scalia
determined that “Aereo does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple
reason that it does not make the choice of content.”215 This is the only
209
Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 13 n.8, Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147532 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014) (NO. 14-CV-7114(DLC)).
210
See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2004); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
211
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212
Id. at 2514.
213
Id. at 2513–14 (“A copy shop rents out photocopiers on a per-use basis. One
customer might copy his 10-year-old’s drawings—a perfectly lawful thing to do—while
another might duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted photographs—a use clearly
prohibited by § 106(1). Either way, the customer chooses the content and activates the
copying function; the photocopier does nothing except in response to the customer’s
commands. Because the shop plays no role in selecting the content, it cannot be held
directly liable when a customer makes an infringing copy. . . . the fact that the copy
shop does not choose the content simply means that its culpability will be assessed
using secondary-liability rules rather than direct-liability rules.”) (citing Sony, 464 U.S.
at 434–42; CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550; Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008)).
214
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2513–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Grokster, 545 U.S.
at 960 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he producer of a technology which permits
unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying. . . .”)).
215
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514.
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possible conclusion that the Court can reach using the traditional
volitional conduct requirement. This conclusion does not mean that
Aereo is off the hook; instead, Aereo, while not being directly liable,
will under the same facts certainly be found to have produced
equipment capable of infringing copyrights, making a finding of
contributory infringement likely.216
The problem with the Aereo decision, with respect to volitional
conduct, lies in the fact that the majority of the Court failed to even
mention the only test for direct copyright infringement that the Court
has ever supported in the past. The majority was so bothered by what
Aereo was doing that the Court flew right past volitional conduct to
establish a new test, which is applicable only to those technologies that,
in a black-box analysis, resemble CATV systems of the 1960s. Justice
Breyer failed to mention volitional conduct, not because of its
irrelevancy, but because it would undermine the majority’s position, as
it is the user that selects which program to view or record, not Aereo
or Aereo’s system.
To demonstrate the flaws inherent in the majority’s new standard,
consider a hypothetical with all of the facts of the Aereo case, but one
key difference. Instead of capturing broadcast television signals,
assume that Aereo is, at the request of the user, capturing copyrighted
radio broadcasts (e.g., an NPR broadcast). Aereo still uses its
warehouse of antennas and produces user-specific copies that are
transmitted via the Internet to only the specific user who requested to
listen to the program. What result now? Congress did not amend the
Copyright Act to address any issues with radio broadcasts, so
presumably there is no looks-like-a-radio-broadcast test that the Court
could formulate from legislative history. One would think that in this
hypothetical, the Court would have to apply the only test there is for
direct infringement: the volitional conduct requirement. The result is
a fractured copyright law where television broadcasters receive more
protection than radio broadcasters by virtue of the fact that the last
major overhaul of the Copyright Act was in response to the
proliferation of CATV systems.
Recall, this is an appeal of limited scope. All that the Court is
dealing with is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary
injunction against Aereo alleging direct infringement of the plaintiffs’
public performance right for only the “Watch” portion of Aereo’s
service, which allows users to contemporaneously view broadcast
216
See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913 (describing contributory infringement); Sony,
464 U.S. at 417 (describing the difference between fair use and contributory
infringement).
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programs on Aereo’s system while those programs are being aired.217
By no means did the Court need to rule against Aereo on this specific
appeal in order for Aereo to be found liable for some form of copyright
infringement. The plaintiffs in the case alleged multiple theories of
liability “including infringement of the public performance right,
infringement of the right of reproduction, and contributory
infringement.”218
If the majority were to apply the traditional volitional conduct test
to the facts at bar, the outcome almost certainly would have been in
favor of Aereo. Instead, the Court has opened the door to uncertainty;
now that there is a special direct infringement test for “cable systems,”
what is to keep the Court from expanding to other tests for other
industries? Copyright law is an ever-changing beast, as it must be,
because the introduction of new technology changes societal norms
requiring changes in the law to keep up with technological and societal
progress. The Founders wisely left the power to amend the law to
Congress because it is a delicate process that requires the balancing of
competing interests in an ever-changing society. The Court is not the
place to fashion new standards on a case-by-case basis because having
a different copyright law standard for each technology capable of
producing copyrightable works is impracticable and inefficient.
Congress is able to weigh competing interests in developing new laws
that strive to strike an appropriate balance between technological and
scientific progress and the rights that should be afforded to the
creators of artistic works.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, the basis for disagreement with respect to the Aereo
decision comes down to separation of powers and the role that the
Court should play in creating the law. The majority seems to believe
that it is the Court’s role to expand protections provided by the
Copyright Act to reach those technologies, which, in the Court’s view,
would have been a target of Congress half a century ago. On the other
hand, those who believe in the separation of powers view the
expansion of copyright protection as a job for Congress, which is given
the sole authority to create such laws under the Constitution. The flaws
in the Aereo decision clearly demonstrate why the Court is an improper
venue for the creation of legislation. In order for the majority to reach
a conclusion, the Justices had to create a new standard for direct
217
218

See supra text accompanying notes 119 & 120.
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
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copyright infringement, which applies only to a single type of entity,
and is unsupported by any precedent. While Congress is in a position
to make full-scale updates to the Copyright Act and provide new
avenues for emerging technologies to fit neatly within a system that
respects not only the rights of copyright holders but also the societal
advantages of scientific progress, the Court has no such power.
Instead, the Court has created a rule, with no specific guidelines, that
applies to only one section of the Copyright Act for one specific type
of technology and has no bearing on other sections of the Copyright
Act.
In adopting the looks-like-cable-TV standard, the Court
simultaneously disregarded the traditional volitional conduct test.
While the majority opinion never expressly rejected the test, briefs in
the district courts following the ruling show that parties are reading
the opinion to indicate such a rejection. What we are left with is a
fragmented and drastically expanded state of copyright law that will
take years to piece back together.

